Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
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Beschreibung
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded
rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into
focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons
from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded
rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive
provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the
power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in
multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded
rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and
mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the
study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands
of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed
analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
Pulls together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design Provides detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts Makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
Autor*in
Suren Basov
Themen in »Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts«
Auction Theory Behavioral Economics Bounded Rationality Boundedly Rational Agent Contract Theory Decision Theory Economic Equilibrium Economic Theory Economic Uncertainty Game Theory Imperfect Information Incomplete Contracts Mechanism Design Opportunity Cost Optimal Contracts