Economic Analysis of Liability Rules
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Beschreibung
This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.
The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
This book focuses on the analysis of liability rules of tort law from an efficiency perspective, presenting a comprehensive analysis of these rules in a self-contained and rigorous yet accessible manner. It establishes general results on the efficiency of liability rules, including complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules. The book also establishes that the untaken precaution approach and decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency.
The economic analysis of tort law has established that for efficiency it is necessary that each party to the interaction must be made to internalize the harm resulting from the interaction. The characterization and impossibility theorems presented in this book establish that, in addition to internalization of the harm by each party, there are two additional requirements for efficiency. Firstly, rules must be immune from strategic manipulation. Secondly, rules must entail closure with respect to the parties involved in the interaction giving rise to the negative externality, i.e., the liability must not be decoupled.
Presents a comprehensive analysis of liability rules Contains complete characterizations of efficient liability rules and efficient incremental liability rules Establishes that the untaken precaution approach as well as decoupled liability are incompatible with efficiency Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
Autor*in
Satish Kumar Jain
Themen in »Economic Analysis of Liability Rules«
Externalities Law and Economics Liability Rules Non-Efficiency Values The Coase Theorem Tort Model
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“The book under review is an excellent text which deals with some key topics in the field of law and economics … . most fascinating element of this book is its elegant framework of analysis which is simple and yet quite general and rigorous. … This book has the potential to foster further study of law and legal system … . It is highly recommended for those who are looking for research agenda in the field of law and economics.” (Papiya Ghosh, Indian Economic Review, Vol. 52, 2017)
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