First-Person Thought
Action, Identification and Experience
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Beschreibung
The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.
Autor*in
Maik Niemeck
Themen in »First-Person Thought«
First Person Thought Action Identification Experience Niemeck Selbstbewusstsein Bewusstsein Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation De Se Skeptizismus Indexikalische Gedanken Selbstsorge Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein