Time-varying capital requirements and disclosure rules

Beschreibung

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bankspecific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bankspecific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.
steht auch als elektronisches Dokument zur Verfügung (ISBN 978-3-95729-463-0)

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Björn Imbierowicz

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