Market discipline across bank governance models
empirical evidence from German depositors
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Beschreibung
German savers are renowned for preferring safe, long-term investments, thus
providing patient capital, with bank deposits playing an important role. Using a
comprehensive data set for the German banking sector, we examine whether German
depositors are really that patient, abstaining from any type of market discipline,
and how the nancial crisis might have changed a well-established habit. Our
empirical investigation reveals the existence of market discipline with a high degree
of heterogeneity depending on banks' governance structures. The announcement
of a state guarantee for bank deposits following the collapse of Lehman Brothers
succeeded in calming depositors of all banking groups but did not remove market
discipline entirely. Remaining disciplinary reactions by depositors of di erent
banking groups increase in homogeneity but some di erences remain.
Steht auch als Elektronisches Dokument zur Verfügung (ISBN 978-3-95729-151-6)
Autor*in
Eva A. Arnold
Themen in »Market discipline across bank governance models«
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