Executive Compensation
Three Essays on Managerial Risk-Taking, Long-Term Orientation, and Convergence in Executive Compensation
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Beschreibung
The empirical analyses of data from large German public companies that are presented in this book show that the introduction of long-term orientated remuneration components for corporate executives increases their willingness to invest in riskier investment portfolios, at least in the short term. The study furthermore demonstrates that a payment model which emphasises equity-based remuneration elements is not sufficient to increase executives' long-term orientation. The results of the study’s final analysis show that payment of executives in large German public companies has become more consistent across the board in recent years.
Autor*in
Friedrich Kley
Themen in »Executive Compensation«
Long-term incentive programs (LTIPs) Risk CEO Pay Vorstandsvergütung Langfristigkeit Risikoneigung Konvergenz Managerial Decision-Taking DAX Employee Participation Program (EPP)