High-Level Side-Channel Leakage Models with Application to Compilers

Beschreibung

Side-channel attacks allow the extraction of secret keys from implementations of cryptographic algorithms. A typical solution to prevent this kind of attacks is the application of masking countermeasures to split secrets into multiple shares. To be effective, a strict separation of the shares is required during processing. Due to the leakage characteristics of the underlying hardware, this requirement is very challenging in practice. This thesis introduces a novel high-level side-channel leakage model of CPUs to instruct code generators to emit assembly code with the necessary separation of shares.

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Hermann Zeno Seuschek

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Side-Channel Attacks Leakage Model Secure Code Generator

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