Public Procurement in the European Union
How Contracting Authorities Can Improve Their Procurement Performance in Tenders
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Beschreibung
Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.
Contents
- Definition of performance management in tenders
- Identification of Contracting Authorities’ scope of action
- Discussion of performance-oriented measures
- Investigation of starting price publication
- Analysis of starting price precision
- Derivation of managerial and regulative implications
Target Groups
- Researchers and students focusing on behavioral economics
- Experts in public procurement and private-sector purchasing
The Author Alexander Rhode studied business administration at the University of Mannheim and the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. He completed his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Uta Herbst at the University of Potsdam. He works for a leading global consultancy firm focusing on the healthcare sector.
Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.
Determinants of Procurment Performance in Tenders
Autor*in
Alexander Rhode
Themen in »Public Procurement in the European Union«
Public Procurement in the European Union Contracting Authorities Procurement Performance in Tenders Public tender Tender Tender performance Anchor effects Anchoring Starting prices Precision effects Price ranges Performance-oriented measures Investigation of starting price publication Derivation of managerial