The book considers sequential competitive location problems on networks. It reviews the relevant literature and extends well known models by incorporating proportional choice rules, edge demand or a pricing stage. The models are analyzed with respect to their computational complexity. Mathematical models and adequate solution methods are presented.
This book deals with classical competitive location problems where two players, leader and follower, sequentially enter markets with given numbers of facilities. The markets under consideration are represented as networks. The book provides a detailed overview of the literature on competitive and voting location, and it presents extensions and variations of the classical models, with a focus on the incorporation of proportional choice rules, non-discrete demand (edge demand), or additional pricing decisions of the players. It provides corresponding mathematical models, insights into the computational complexity of the resulting problems and proposes and analyzes adequate solution methods.
Dominik Kreß
Centroid Problem Competitive Kreß Location Medianoid Problem Netwo Networks Proportional Choice Sequential Voting Location