Crime and Punishment from a Game Theoretical Perspective
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Beschreibung
Heiko Rauhut develops a new game theoretical perspective on crime and punishment by integrating the sociology of deviant behavior with the economic model of crime. The theoretical debate is concerned with understanding the empirical puzzle why more severe punishment does not deter crime. This surprising evidence can be explained with game theoretical methods, demonstrating that more severe punishment will rather cause less control activities than having effects on criminal behavior. Owing to the methodological shortcomings of field investigations, Heiko Rauhut conducted the first series of laboratory experiments in the area of crime and punishment. The data confirms the main reasoning that more severe punishment causes less control and, reversely, stronger incentives for control agents cause less crime. The empirical investigation is consolidated and extended with simulation models, lending support to theories of bounded rationality in the area of social norms and crime.
Heiko Rauhut develops a new game theoretical perspective on crime and punishment by integrating the sociology of deviant behavior with the economic model of crime. The theoretical debate is concerned with understanding the empirical puzzle why more severe punishment does not deter crime. This surprising evidence can be explained with game theoretical methods, demonstrating that more severe punishment will rather cause less control activities than having effects on criminal behavior. Owing to the methodological shortcomings of field investigations, Heiko Rauhut conducted the first series of laboratory experiments in the area of crime and punishment. The data confirms the main reasoning that more severe punishment causes less control and, reversely, stronger incentives for control agents cause less crime. The empirical investigation is consolidated and extended with simulation models, lending support to theories of bounded rationality in the area of social norms and crime.
new theoretical and methodological approaches
Heiko Rauhut develops a new game theoretical perspective on crime and punishment by integrating the sociology of deviant behavior with the economic model of crime. The theoretical debate is concerned with understanding the empirical puzzle why more severe punishment does not deter crime. This surprising evidence can be explained with game theoretical methods, demonstrating that more severe punishment will rather cause less control activities than having effects on criminal behavior. Owing to the methodological shortcomings of field investigations, Heiko Rauhut conducted the first series of laboratory experiments in the area of crime and punishment. The data confirms the main reasoning that more severe punishment causes less control and, reversely, stronger incentives for control agents cause less crime. The empirical investigation is consolidated and extended with simulation models, lending support to theories of bounded rationality in the area of social norms and crime.
Autor*in
Heiko Rauhut
Themen in »Crime and Punishment from a Game Theoretical Perspective«
Experiment Kriminalität Rational-Choice-Theorie Simulation Spieltheorie