People disagree frequently, about both objective and subjective matters. But while at least one party must be wrong in a disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they? In recent years, a number of philosophers and linguists have argued that we must become relativists about truth to understand faultless disagreements. This book shows that we can dispense with relativism. It combines a more standard semantics with a novel pragmatic theory to develop a superior approach. The book discusses both classic and recent literature in philosophy and linguistics. It provides a general introduction to the debate about the semantics and pragmatics of perspectival expressions, as well as an original contribution to the contemporary discussion.
Campuslizenz. Abgabe nur an Bibliotheken über folgende Aggregatoren:
EBL: www.schweitzer-online.de
Ebrary: www.ebrary.com
Ebsco: www.ebscohost.com
MyiLibrary: www.myilibrary.com
Preselect.media: www.preselect.com
Julia Zakkou
Analytical Philosophy Commonality Contextualism Disagreement Faultlessness Language Linguistics Metalinguistics Philosophy of Language Pragmatism Semantics