This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.
This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.
Hirokazu Kikuchi
National politics Federalism Political decentralization Regional governors Legislator behaviour Tenure power Gubernatorial effects Argentine Senate Legislative politics latin american politics
“Who influences lawmakers when they vote on public policy? In federal and presidential systems, accountability is especially complex because the set of potential actors exerting influence over legislators is large. Kikuchi delivers the most careful and detailed study to date, on how these forces interact to shape legislative representation in Argentina, a critical case of presidential federalism, explaining how federalism shapes prospects for presidential success in the legislature.”(John M. Carey, Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College, USA)
“This book is a fascinating study on the influence of subnational politicians at the national legislative process. It shows how the upper chamber —the Argentine Senate— functions as the arena where governors, through their legislators, seek to amend or veto presidential policies. This thorough analysis of the Argentine legislativeprocess is an enormous theoretical and empirical contribution on how the institutions of presidentialism and federalism work.” (Mariana Llanos, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Germany)