This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework involving the eclectic use of national security based realism, economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea, a case is built that a state’s leadership decides whether to keep or give up “the Bomb” based on interlinked security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter, frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability. This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, WMD analystsand post graduate or undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related courses
Systematically analyses nuclear weapons retention and relinquishment policy from security, economics and norms based perspectives
It compiles a broad range of relevant case studies, including: South Africa, Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Pakistan
Provides prescriptive criteria for detecting potential nuclear proliferation and encouraging nuclear disarmament
Liang Tuang Nah
security economics bomb non-proliferation morality nuclear weapons national security global economic interdependence Nuclear Non-Proliferation morality Nuclear disarmament nuclear armament North Korea South Africa Nuclear policy Iran