Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher’s ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.
Addresses a gap in the literature: recognises that the work of Arne Naess and approaches in experimental philosophy more generally are yet to significantly permeate debates about truth, and offers a valuable move in that direction
Advances scholarship: outlines the case for an innovative theory of pluralism about truth, endoxic alethic pluralism
Makes complex ideas accessible: uses the shortened Palgrave Pivot format to present material in a succinct and digestible manner
Joseph Ulatowski
Endoxic alethic pluralism Experimental philosophy Metaphysics Ecology Empirical semantics Arne Næss normativity