Economic Analysis of Contract Law
Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information
Buch in deiner Nähe kaufen
Beschreibung
This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
Deals with a specific but most pragmatic aspect of contractual environment where the application of contract laws and their efficiency estimates are not explored much in the contemporary literature Specifically written for economists interested in models of the incentive effects of contract remedies Uses legal examples from case laws to lie the foundation for every model discussed
Autor*in
Sugata Bag
Themen in »Economic Analysis of Contract Law«
Breach remedies Optimal Contract mechanism design Social welfare theory of contract law economic exchange Principal-Agent paradigm