To do justice to the concept of "property," protection is needed against unexpected claims and risks, particularly against deprivation by the state without compensation. This can only be fully achieved through a substantive concept of expropriation that places the holder of the fundamental right at its center.
In its 1981 landmark decision on expropriation (the so-called "Nassauskiesungsbeschluss“), the German Federal Constitutional Court sparked a doctrinal development that resulted in a strictly formal concept of expropriation. Interference with property that it does not aim to procure is considered a regulatory measure and falls outside its scope. As opposed to expropriation, there is no constitutional requirement that necessitates compensation. The author challenges this view, providing a counternarrative of the right to property which is based on the wording of the German Basic Law and on the norms of international and European law as well as on comparative law considerations.
Markus P. Beham
Geboren 1986; Studium der Rechtswissenschaften in Wien und Thessaloniki; 2015 Master of Laws, LL.M. (New York); 2016 Promotion (Paris und Wien); Forschungsaufenthalte in Den Haag und Cambridge; Akademischer Oberrat am Lehrstuhl für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht, Völkerrecht, Europäisches und Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht an der Universität Passau.
Eigentum Europarecht Rechtsvergleichung Verfassungsrecht Völkerrecht