The deliberate breach of international treaties by the legislator raises a number of constitutional questions. Martin Schäfer considers, inter alia, whether the German constitution's often-cited openness to international law and the principle of separation of powers pose an obstacle to the practice of treaty overriding.
The deliberate breach of international treaties by the legislator raises a number of constitutional questions. Martin Schäfer considers, inter alia, whether the German constitution's often-cited openness to international law and the principle of separation of powers pose an obstacle to the practice of treaty overriding.
Martin Schäfer
Geboren 1989; Studium der Rechtswissenschaften an der Universität Bonn; Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für deutsches und europäisches Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht; 2019 Promotion; derzeit Rechtsreferendar am LG Bonn.
Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit Auswärtige Gewalt Normenhierarchie Gewaltenteilung