In the aftermath of 1945, why were practitioners of law rarely sentenced for the crimes they committed during the Nazi era? Was it because the judges themselves were former Nazi party members or sympathisers? For Alexander Hoeppel, this train of thought does not go far enough: his study reveals that German jurisprudence actually went to the extent of adopting a legal doctrine that shielded judges and other legal professionals from being prosecuted for crimes committed in office - and continues to do so even to this day.
In the aftermath of 1945, why were practitioners of law rarely sentenced for the crimes they committed during the Nazi era? Was it because the judges themselves were former Nazi party members or sympathisers? For Alexander Hoeppel, this train of thought does not go far enough: his study reveals that German jurisprudence actually went to the extent of adopting a legal doctrine that shielded judges and other legal professionals from being prosecuted for crimes committed in office - and continues to do so even to this day.
Alexander Hoeppel
Geboren 1984; Studium der Neueren und Neuesten Geschichte, der Politischen Wissenschaft und der Philosophie; Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter am Zentralinstitut für Angewandte Ethik und Wissenschaftskommunikation an der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg; Projektleiter des Model United Nations Projektes der Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAUMUN); Lehrbeauftragter für Verhandlungslehre ebenda; seit 2017 selbstständiger Verhandlungstrainer; 2018 Promotion.
Nationalsozialismus Richterprivileg Scheinverfahren Radbruchsche Formel Vergangenheitsbewältigung