In its basic rights doctrine, security takes on various different guises. However, the understandings of security as a legitimate aim, as a positive obligation to protect, or even as a fundamental right, do not do justice to its special need to be treated differently. How, then, might security be fundamentally re-thought?
In its basic rights doctrine, security takes on various different guises. However, the understandings of security as a legitimate aim, as a positive obligation to protect, or even as a fundamental right, do not do justice to its special need to be treated differently. How, then, might security be fundamentally re-thought?
Sebastian Leuschner
Geboren 1985; Studium der European Studies an der Universität Magdeburg und der Rechtswissenschaft an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; Wiss. Mitarbeiter am Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht der HU Berlin; Wiss. Mitarbeiter am Alexander von Humboldt-Institut für Internet und Gesellschaft, Berlin; 2017 Promotion; seit 2016 Referendar am KG Berlin.
Grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht Grundrecht auf Sicherheit Grundrechtsdogmatik Unionsgrundrechte EU Europäische Union