Julian Staben examines chilling effects, framed as deterrence-based lines of argument, in the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) and compares them with the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court. Chilling effects follow distinct patterns when it comes to online behaviour and emerging digital practices and therefore call for their constitutional reassessment. Julian Staben's work enables a more methodologically reflective use of these arguments in the judicial discourse.
Julian Staben examines chilling effects, framed as deterrence-based lines of argument, in the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) and compares them with the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court. Chilling effects follow distinct patterns when it comes to online behaviour and emerging digital practices and therefore call for their constitutional reassessment. Julian Staben's work enables a more methodologically reflective use of these arguments in the judicial discourse.
Julian Staben
Geboren 1987; Studium der Rechtswissenschaft an der Bucerius Law School und der University of Cambridge; seit 2012 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Alexander von Humboldt Institut für Internet und Gesellschaft in Berlin; 2014 Visiting Scholar an der University of Virginia School of Law; 2016 Promotion; 2015-17 Referendar am Kammergericht, Berlin.
Einschüchterungseffekt chilling effect Internet Grundrechtsverwirklichung Abschreckung