Wolfgang Servatius examines the legal impact of a company's creditors who are increasingly becoming part of good corporate governance in Germany.
Wolfgang Servatius examines the legal impact of a company's creditors who are increasingly becoming part of good corporate governance in Germany. Their decisions on how management should behave and the contractual protection in covenants of loan agreements may be seen as a market-oriented chance to avoid a company's insolvency. In respect to this outside influence of creditors on companies, the author favors a liberal approach as long as a corresponding responsibility can be developed. The basis for such lender control liability can be seen in an extensive application of the German legal rules on the recharacterization of loans as equity.
Wolfgang Servatius
Geboren 1969; Studium der Rechtswissenschaft in Mainz, Glasgow und München; 2003 Promotion; 2008 Habilitation; seit 2007 Vertretung des Lehrstuhls für Bürgerliches Recht und Unternehmensrecht an der Universität Regensburg.
Unternehmensfinanzierung Covenants Mezzanine-Finanzierung Gläubigerverantwort