The book analyses Iraqi Army’s reconstruction in the post-Saddam era. Despite an apparent plan and a coalition in charge, the research identified multiple consideration, planning and synchronisation issues. The roles of actors like the United Nations or national governments are isolated and discussed through a unique method.
The book aims to answer the central question: "What went wrong, more precisely, in the decision chain during the reconstruction of Iraq’s military institution?" The holistic character of the approach is ensured through a series of background analyses.
Although most researches concluded already that Iraq’s reconstruction was a failure, answering the question implied the design of an appropriate research method and data collection/analysis, in order to frame particular characteristics of the reconstruction process. Despite the complexity of the topic and theoretical Security Sector Reform principles, which can hardly be applied to Iraq’s case, the thesis emphasizes on actors involved, their actions and connections between events, as part of a unique process.
Ecaterina-Elena C. Matoi
Army Building Case Challenges Döring Ecaterina Elena Gegenstandsbezogene Theoriebildung Geschichte des Irak Iraq Iraqi Koalition der willigen Matoi Post Saddam