The Mirroring Fallacy

Beschreibung

“A rigorous historical corrective. Ward demonstrates why intent matters as much as capability, with urgent implications for how we read Beijing's naval strategy.”

–Lord Mark Sedwill, former Cabinet Secretary and UK National Security Adviser 

“This important book challenges the common assumption of western naval analysts that the Soviet Union created a large navy to challenge American and NATO sea control, and that the same objective is shaping the strategy of the People's Republic of China.”

–Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History, Kings College, London, UK

 “Ward draws ably on the lessons of history to provide a valuable corrective to the mirroring fallacy. National security professionals should take his words to heart to better avoid the analytical bias that can arise from inferring intent from capability.”

–Dr Emma Salisbury, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA

This book brings historical analysis to fears of a naval arms race in the Asia-Pacific. The lesson of the second half of the Cold War shows the misleading effect of mirroring Western naval intent onto adversaries. By unpacking fears about the size of the Chinese navy and concentrating on Chinese intent, a historical pattern emerges of naval misperception. Guarding against this mirroring fallacy will improve decision-making on both sides.

Lieutenant Commander Andrew Ward is an information warfare officer in the UK Royal Navy. Having served at sea in destroyers HMS Dragon and Duncan, he was the 2023-24 Hudson visiting fellow at Oxford University. He read Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College, Oxford and holds an MA in Defence and Security Studies from King’s College London. In 2025 Andrew sailed with the UK Carrier Strike Group in the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales to the Asia-Pacific.

This book brings historical analysis to fears of a naval arms race in the Asia-Pacific.  The lesson of the second half of the Cold War shows the misleading effect of mirroring Western naval intent onto adversaries.  By unpacking fears about the size of the Chinese navy and concentrating on Chinese intent, a historical pattern emerges of naval misperception.  Guarding against this mirroring fallacy will improve decision-making on both sides.

Autor*in

Andrew Ward

Themen in »The Mirroring Fallacy«

Soviet Navy PLAN China mirroring intelligence failure sea power bias maritime strategy

Stimmen zu »The Mirroring Fallacy«

“A rigorous historical corrective. Ward demonstrates why intent matters as much as capability, with urgent implications for how we read Beijing's naval strategy.” (Lord Mark Sedwill, Former UK Cabinet Secretary and National Security Adviser)

“This important book challenges the common assumption of western naval analysts that the now defunct Soviet Union created a large navy to challenge American and NATO sea control during the Cold War, and that the same objective is shaping the strategy of the People's Republic of China. Russian and Chinese empires, past and present, share the autocratic political model suitable for multi-ethnic continental empires and primarily defensive strategies at sea. Both have long and bitter experience of being attacked from the sea, by amphibious forces and maritime economic pressure. They consistently adopted defensive strategies, to reduce the risk of economic blockade, and latterly securing bastion areas for ballistic missile deterrent submarines. There is no evidence to suggest they were, or are, building fleets to rule the oceans. Global sea control remains the cornerstone of western security.” (Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History, Kings College, London, UK)

“This excellent, evidence-based study is essential reading for military strategists, policymakers and students of international relations and defence. Ward uses two maritime case histories to describe a key psychological misreading that over-values capability at the expense of intent – with dangerous geopolitical consequences.” (Lord John Alderdice, House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, former Executive Chairman of the Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, UK)

“This original study reveals how an over-emphasis on the growth in capability of the Soviet navy shaped American naval power projection for decades. Could similar mirror-imaging lead to a mistaken analysis of contemporary Chinese naval intent and China’s approach to sea power? Fascinating reading for both strategic studies scholars and naval practitioners.” (Roy Allison, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations, St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK)

“Ward draws ably on the lessons of history to provide a valuable corrective to the mirroring fallacy. National security professionals should take his words to heart to better avoid the analytical bias that can arise due to inferring intent from capability.” (Dr Emma Salisbury, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA)

“This book offers a salient reminder of the risks arising from mirror imaging in threat perception and military strategy. Ward argues that Western navies frequently misinterpreted Soviet intentions during the Cold War. His conclusions on today's great power competition between the US and China are certain to invite debate. Overall, the study reinforces the enduring value of net assessment and cultural understanding of 'the other'.” (Dr. William D. James, author of “British Grand Strategy in the Age of American Hegemony”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)

“With great power competitors actively reshaping their naval capabilities, the timing of this work could not be more critical. Andrew Ward’s synthesis of operational insight with academic rigour, examining both Chinese and Russian maritime development through fresh analytical lenses, makes this book essential reading for military professionals and policymakers alike.” (Dr James WE Smith, Laughton-Corbett Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, UK)

“This valuable, thought-provoking book explores the twin dangers of ‘mirroring’ and over-emphasising capability when judging a potential naval opponent’s role and intent.  Drawing lessons from Western perceptions of the Soviet Navy in the Cold War, Ward challenges us with a fresh look at the real motives driving China’s present naval expansion. Essential reading for anyone interested in the contemporary application of naval power.” (Dr Andrew Boyd, author of British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century winner of the 2021 Mountbatten Prize, UK)

“Andrew Ward has given us a fascinating new take on past Soviet and contemporary Chinese naval posture. It provides a salutary reminder that — however much we try to infer potential adversaries' intentions from their observed capabilities — their underlying priorities, preferences and plans may be quite different.” (Dr David Blagden, Associate Professor of International Security and Strategy, University of Exeter, UK)

“Ward's well-researched book is a nuanced and compelling argument about how to draw on historical examples the better to assess the development of an adversary's evolving power as we look to the future. Reflecting insightfully on Western Cold War era assessments of Soviet maritime power, he offers important lessons for assessing the growth of Chinese naval power today and tomorrow.” (Dr Andrew Monaghan, Senior Associate Fellow, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy)

Details

Link teilen