The Paradox of Thought Experiments in Pragmatics
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Beschreibung
The development of pragmatics has been shaped by thought experiments without which it could not have become an autonomous subfield of linguistics. However, their nature and their impact on current trends in pragmatics has not yet been made subject to systematic scrutiny. The book addresses that gap by confronting a central puzzle: How can thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication when they take place entirely within the researcher’s imagination. The volume offers a clear and original answer by showing that their power lies not in invention or speculation, but in a disciplined process of argumentative re evaluation of existing experiential knowledge.
The book is unique in at least two respects. First, it presents carefully elaborated case studies on Searle’s and Grice’s seminal thought experiments, which yield an original solution to the paradox. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics neither generate new experiential information per se, nor are they mere speculations on imaginary situations. Rather, their novelty is rooted in the plausible argumentation process during which they cyclically and prismatically re-evaluate experiential information. Second, through this solution, the book contributes to the controversies on the semantics–pragmatics interface in particular as well as the methodological foundations of pragmatic research in general.
Written with conceptual clarity and supported by extensive engagement with current scholarship, this volume is of vital interest to researchers and advanced students in pragmatics, cognitive linguistics as well as the history and philosophy of linguistics.
The development of pragmatics has been shaped by thought experiments without which it could not have become an autonomous subfield of linguistics. However, their nature and their impact on current trends in pragmatics has not yet been made subject to systematic scrutiny. The book addresses that gap by confronting a central puzzle: How can thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication when they take place entirely within the researcher’s imagination. The volume offers a clear and original answer by showing that their power lies not in invention or speculation, but in a disciplined process of argumentative re evaluation of existing experiential knowledge.
The book is unique in at least two respects. First, it presents carefully elaborated case studies on Searle’s and Grice’s seminal thought experiments, which yield an original solution to the paradox. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics neither generate new experiential information per se, nor are they mere speculations on imaginary situations. Rather, their novelty is rooted in the plausible argumentation process during which they cyclically and prismatically re-evaluate experiential information. Second, through this solution, the book contributes to the controversies on the semantics–pragmatics interface in particular as well as the methodological foundations of pragmatic research in general.
Written with conceptual clarity and supported by extensive engagement with current scholarship, this volume is of vital interest to researchers and advanced students in pragmatics, cognitive linguistics as well as the history and philosophy of linguistics.
Explores how thought experiments shape pragmatic theory through cyclic and context‑sensitive reasoning Demonstrates the role of plausible argumentation in resolving paradox, circularity and inconsistency Bridges linguistic pragmatics with philosophy of science to clarify how theories generate empirical insight
Autor*in
András Kertész
Themen in »The Paradox of Thought Experiments in Pragmatics«
Thought experiments in pragmatics Paradox of thought experiments P-model (plausible reasoning model) Experimental pragmatics Gricean implicature