Judges, Law, and Partisanship
Redistricting Challenges in American Courts
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Beschreibung
How do federal judges in the lower courts and justices in state supreme courts decide highly political and polarizing redistricting disputes? This study develops a complex view of judicial behavior in redistricting. When the law is clear, lower court judges don’t show any partisan favoritism in their rulings. When the law is ambiguous, judges tend to favor their party in cases, especially when their party is the victim of partisan line drawing by the state. McKenzie shows that polarization has increased over time in opinions about redistricting by federal judges, but federal judges who were independents prior to coming to the bench tend to be immune to partisanship. No state supreme court system appears immune to at least some partisan behavior. Judges, Law and Partisanship details important implications for how we view courts in partisan political disputes and what reforms to the process are possible.
Mark Jonathan McKenzie’s sweeping study of judges deciding redistricting cases peels back the curtain on these rulings. Pointedly, McKenzie explains how much of a role judicial partisanship plays in the election boundaries that decide who represents us in the state house and halls of Congress. A must-read for redistricting scholars. - Seth C McKee, Oklahoma State University
Judges, Law, and Partisanship provides an important and timely discussion of judicial partisanship and the evolving role of courts in these highly polarized electoral conflicts. I highly recommend it. - Henrik Litleré Bentsen, Norwegian Research Centre
Mark McKenzie usefully peers into the black box of judicial decisionmaking in the politically fraught context of redistricting. Using valuable survey responses from federal judges and statistical analysis, he shows when the partisanship of the judge matters as state and federal courts police alleged gerrymanders. - Richard L. Hasen, author of A Real Right to Vote
Mark Jonathan McKenzie is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas Tech University and a licensed attorney in Texas.
How do federal judges in the lower courts and justices in state supreme courts decide highly political and polarizing redistricting disputes? This study develops a complex view of judicial behavior in redistricting. When the law is clear, lower court judges don’t show any partisan favoritism in their rulings. When the law is ambiguous, judges tend to favor their party in cases, especially when their party is the victim of partisan line drawing by the state. McKenzie shows that polarization has increased over time in opinions about redistricting by federal judges, but federal judges who were independents prior to coming to the bench tend to be immune to partisanship. No state supreme court system appears immune to at least some partisan behavior. Judges, Law and Partisanship details important implications for how we view courts in partisan political disputes and what reforms to the process are possible.
Comprehensively examines how partisanship and the law affect judging in redistricting Analyzes over 200 judicial responses over a decade to demonstrate polarization in the judiciary over time Provides quantitative statistical analysis of redistricting cases in state and federal courts since 1981
Autor*in
Mark Jonathan McKenzie
Themen in »Judges, Law, and Partisanship«
Redistricting Judicial Decision Making Partisanship Polarization Gerrymandering Voting Rights Act Judicial Behavior Behavioral Politics Judicial Bias State Courts Federal Courts