In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses
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“In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses has the great virtues of being really clear and really interesting. Sam Fellowes lucidly sets out some fundamental issues in the philosophy of science and uses them to illuminate contested issues in psychiatric nosology. Philosophers, clinicians and mental health researchers can all learn a lot from this, and find new ways to talk to each other.”
—Dominic Murphy, Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney, author of Psychiatry in the Scientific Image (2006)
“In this thought-provoking book, Sam Fellowes attempts to undermine many influential criticisms of contemporary psychiatric diagnoses by undermining the assumptions about the nature of science on which they rest. He defends, instead, a neo-Kantian view of science as a whole, which highlights the role of construction and idealisation rather than a simple mirroring of the natural world. The result is both a detailed scholarly defence of neo-Kantian philosophy of science and a timely intervention in discussions of psychiatric classification.”
—Tim Thornton, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Mental Health, University of Central Lancashire, author of Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry (2007)
This open access book makes a distinctive contribution by providing a novel defence of psychiatric diagnoses. It defends psychiatric diagnoses by portraying them as idealised models understood in a neo-Kantian sense. It reject accounts which see psychiatric diagnoses as biomedical entities or as natural kinds.
Drawing upon this neo-Kantian approach to scientific models, the book provides a novel metaphysical account of what psychiatric diagnoses are and novel epistemological guidelines for constructing psychiatric diagnoses. Psychiatric diagnoses are portrayed as models which abstract away from particular aspects of particular people to create generalised models that are applicable to multiple people.
In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses is essential reading for all scholars and researchers of the philosophy of science especially those focussing on the philosophy of psychiatry.
Sam Fellowes is an Associate Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Politics and Religion at the University of Lancaster, UK.
This open access book makes a distinctive contribution by providing a novel defence of psychiatric diagnoses. It defends psychiatric diagnoses by portraying them as idealised models understood in a neo-Kantian sense. It reject accounts which see psychiatric diagnoses as biomedical entities or as natural kinds.
Drawing upon this neo-Kantian approach to scientific models, the book provides a novel metaphysical account of what psychiatric diagnoses are and novel epistemological guidelines for constructing psychiatric diagnoses. Psychiatric diagnoses are portrayed as models which abstract away from particular aspects of particular people to create generalised models that are applicable to multiple people.
In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses is essential reading for all scholars and researchers of the philosophy of science especially those focussing on the philosophy of psychiatry.
This book is open access, which means that you have free and unlimited access Makes a distinctive contribution by providing a novel defence of psychiatric diagnoses Reject accounts which see psychiatric diagnoses as biomedical entities or as natural kinds Sees diagnoses as models that abstract from particular aspects of individuals to create generalized models
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Sam Fellowes
Themen in »In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses«
Open Access Psychiatric diagnoses Philosophy of psychiatry Neo-Kantianism Scientific models Symptoms
Stimmen zu »In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses«
“In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses has the great virtues of being really clear and really interesting. Sam Fellowes lucidly sets out some fundamental issues in the philosophy of science and uses them to illuminate contested issues in psychiatric nosology. Philosophers, clinicians and mental health researchers can all learn a lot from this, and find new ways to talk to each other.” (Dominic Murphy, Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney, author of “Psychiatry in the Scientific Image” (MIT))
“Sam Fellowes is one of the most innovative and sophisticated thinkers in the philosophy of psychiatry today. In Defence of Psychiatric Diagnoses, he develops a novel neo-Kantian approach to understanding psychiatric diagnosis and classification. Through focussing on the importance of idealisation in psychiatric science, Fellowes manages to explain how mental health diagnoses can be scientifically legitimate without merely mirroring reality.” (Rachel Cooper, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Lancaster University. Author of “Classifying Madness” (Springer, 2005), “Psychiatry and the Philosophy of Science” (Acumen, 2007), “Diagnosing the DSM” (Karnac, 2014))
“In this thought-provoking book, Sam Fellowes attempts to undermine many influential criticisms of contemporary psychiatric diagnoses by undermining the assumptions about the nature of science on which they rest. He defends, instead, a neo-Kantian view of science as a whole, which highlights the role of construction and idealisation rather than a simple mirroring of the natural world. The result is both a detailed scholarly defence of neo-Kantian philosophy of science and a timely intervention in discussions of psychiatric classification.” (Tim Thornton, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Mental Health, University of Central Lancashire, author of “Essential Philosophy of Psychiatry” (OUP))
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