Deception and Delay in Organized Conflict

Beschreibung

This book explores the role of deception, delay, and self-deception in the dynamics of organized conflict, taking a formal approach that hews closely to the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories. The resulting probability models can, with some effort—and some confidence—be converted to statistical tools for the analysis of real-time observational and ‘experimental’ data on institutionalized confrontation across both traditional and emerging ‘Clausewitz Landscapes’.
Provides first formal treatment of delay and deception in organized conflict that focuses on probability models Uses the asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories Explores the dynamics of deception and delay in organized conflict rigorously

Autor*in

Rodrick Wallace

Themen in »Deception and Delay in Organized Conflict«

Conflict and information theory Conflict and control theory Conflict and symmetry breaking Statistical models of organized conflict Cognitive delay and thrashing instability Dynamics of nonergodic systems Institutional cognition and crosstalk Social evolution in organized conflict Institutional Yerkes-Dodson laws Institutional cognition and inverted-U dynamics

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