Kant and Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein
Transcendentalism, Idealism, Illusion
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Beschreibung
"Ritter provides a lucid and fascinating map of the affinities and contrasts between these two philosophers, showing us the limits of contemporary readings of each, and pressing analytic Kantianism forward. A book with lessons worth learning.”
—Juliet Floyd, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, USA
This book suggests that to know how Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophy could have developed from the work of Kant is to know how they relate to each other. The development from the latter to the former is invoked heuristically as a means of interpretation, rather than a historical process or direct influence of Kant on Wittgenstein. Ritter provides a detailed treatment of transcendentalism, idealism, and the concept of illusion in Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s criticism of metaphysics. Notably, it is through the conceptions of transcendentalism and idealism that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be viewed as a transformation of Kantianism. This transformation involves a deflationary conception of transcendental idealism along with the abandonment of both the idea that there can be a priori 'conditions of possibility' logically detachable from what they condition, and the appeal to an original ‘constitution’ of experience.
The closeness of Kant and post-Tractarian Wittgenstein does not exist between their arguments or the views they upheld, but rather in their affiliation against forms of transcendental realism and empirical idealism. Ritter skilfully challenges several dominant views on the relationship of Kant and Wittgenstein, especially concerning the cogency of Wittgenstein-inspired criticism focusing on the role of language in the first Critique, and Kant's alleged commitment to a representationalist conception of empirical intuition.
This book suggests that to know how Wittgenstein’s post-Tractarian philosophy could have developed from the work of Kant is to know how they relate to each other. The development from the latter to the former is invoked heuristically as a means of interpretation, rather than a historical process or direct influence of Kant on Wittgenstein. Ritter provides a detailed treatment of transcendentalism, idealism, and the concept of illusion in Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s criticism of metaphysics. Notably, it is through the conceptions of transcendentalism and idealism that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be viewed as a transformation of Kantianism. This transformation involves a deflationary conception of transcendental idealism along with the abandonment of both the idea that there can be a priori 'conditions of possibility' logically detachable from what they condition, and the appeal to an original ‘constitution’ of experience.
The closeness of Kant and post-Tractarian Wittgenstein does not exist between their arguments or the views they upheld, but rather in their affiliation against forms of transcendental realism and empirical idealism. Ritter skilfully challenges several dominant views on the relationship of Kant and Wittgenstein, especially concerning the cogency of Wittgenstein-inspired criticism focusing on the role of language in the first Critique, and Kant's alleged commitment to a representationalist conception of empirical intuition.
Challenges several dominant views on the relationship between Kant and Wittgenstein Develops a novel interpretation of Kant's Refutation of Idealism as crucially concerned with the temporal determination of the owner of empirical representations Offers a new discussion of Wittgenstein's distinction between the use as subject and use as object of "I" in the light of a neglected manuscript, MS 147
Autor*in
Bernhard Ritter
Themen in »Kant and Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein«
Wittgenstein Kant Language Solipsism Transcendentalism Sceptiscim
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“Ritter provides a lucid and fascinating map of the affinities and contrasts between these two philosophers, showing us the limits of contemporary readings of each, and pressing analytic Kantianism forward. A book with lessons worth learning.” (Juliet Floyd, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, USA)
“Essential reading for anyone interested in the relationship between two of the greatest Western philosophers, or in their rich legacy for contemporary epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind.” (Hans-Johann Glock, Professor of Philosophy, University of Zurich, Switzerland)
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