Cooperative Game Theory Tools in Coalitional Control Networks
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Beschreibung
This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.
This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.
Nominated as an outstanding PhD thesis by the University of Seville, Spain Reports on networked control design using game theoretic methods Presents novel theoretical findings regarding stability Discusses several ideas to solve the combinatorial explosion problem
Autor*in
Francisco Javier Muros
Themen in »Cooperative Game Theory Tools in Coalitional Control Networks«
Game Theory in Control Design Transferable Utility Games Coalitional Model Predictive Control LMI Application to Control Problems Linear Matrix Inequalities for Control Design Iterative Design Methods for Control Networks Constraints on the Shapley Value Shapley Value in Control Networks Banzhaf Value in Coalitional Control Harsanyi Power Solutions in Coalitional Control Detecting Critical Nodes in Control Networks Game Theory for Distributed Control Reducing the Combinatorial Explosion Problem Game Theoretical Randomized Methods Partitioning of Large-Scale Systems