Michael Dummett stands out among his generation as the only Britishphilosopher of language to rival in stature the Americans, Davidsonand Quine. In conjunction with them he has been responsible formuch of the framework within which questions concerning meaning andunderstanding are raised and answered in the late twentieth-centuryAnglo-American tradition. Dummett's output has been prolific andhighly influential, but not always as accessible as it deserves tobe. This book sets out to rectify this situation.
Karen Green offers the first comprehensive introduction toDummett's philosophy of language, providing an overview and summaryof his most important arguments. She argues that Dummett should notbe understood as a determined advocate of anti-realism, but thathis greatest contribution to the philosophy of language is to haveset out the strengths and weaknesses of the three most influentialpositions within contemporary theory of meaning - realism, asepitomised by Frege, the holism to be found in Wittgenstein, Quineand Davidson and the constructivism which can be extracted fromBrouwer. It demonstrates that analytic philosophy as Dummettpractices it, is by no means an outmoded approach to thinking aboutlanguage, but that it is relevant both to cognitive science and tophenomenology.
Karen Green
Geistesphilosophie Linguistics Philosophie Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Sprachphilosophie Sprachwissenschaften Theoretical Linguistics Theoretische Linguistik
'Karen Green has done more than write a study of Dummett'sphilosophy of language. She has in effect written a criticalhistory of the treatment of the theory of meaning by leadingfigures from Frege and Wittgenstein on to the present; and shedemonstrates how, in relation to all of them, Dummett haselaborated his own position, acknowledging what they have severallycontributed while at the same time avoiding their excesses. Sheshows how his judiciously selective denial of bivalence generatesan "anti-realism" which is perfectly consistent with the realism ofcommon sense.' Sir Peter Strawson, University College,Oxford
'For the student, getting to grips with Michael Dummett'sphilosophy can be a formidable task. For Dummett's theses are deepand challenging, and his arguments for them are subtle and complex.Karen Green is to be thanked and commended for this lucid andaccessible account of the main features of Dummett's system ofthought. She explains how Dummett has developed theses from Fregeand Wittgenstein, about objectivity, normativity, systematicity,publicity, and the dependence of thought on language. She tracesalso significant points of contact and contention with Husserl,Brouwer, Quine and Davidson. She explains the anti-realistmisgiving that truth cannot be bivalent for a language in whichmeaning derives from use, and does much to prevent the frequentconfusion of anti-realism with subjective idealism orphenomenalism. All in all, this is a remarkable exposition anddevelopment of the views of one of the most important philosophersof our age.' Professor Neil Tennant, The Ohio StateUniversity
"Overall, this book demonstrates Green's remarkablecommand of the whole of Dummett's writings...Green's discussion ofthhese issues offer a well argued and remarkable cohesiveperspective on the great breadth of Dummett's work." DavidKilfoyle, Philosophy in Review
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