How to Know

Beschreibung

Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative view. The result is a new conception of knowledge, according to which: knowledge is a kind of knowledge-how; Gettiered knowledge is possible (and so we may set aside epistemology's long-standing Gettier problem); knowledge admits of degrees or grades; and knowledge might not have to include epistemically justified belief. This is a distinctively practicalist conception of knowledge: knowledge is a complex ability, able to be stronger or weaker without having to be justificatory. On this view, knowledge is as knowledge can do.
Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. * Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology * Offers a dissolution of epistemology's infamous Gettier problem -- explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place. * Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.

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Stephen Hetherington

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Epistemology Erkenntnistheorie Philosophie Philosophy

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"In his latest book, How to Know, Stephen Hetherington forcefully challenges the orthodox conception of knowledge that has come to dominate nearly all contemporary discussions of knowledge. Hetherington's project is not merely critical, however. Instead he proposes a novel alternative theory of knowledge that he calls Practicalism, a theory that says that at root, all propositional knowledge (knowledge that) is ultimately reducible to practical knowledge (knowledge how). ... Presuppositions and supposed platitudes in philosophy deserve to be challenged. Hetherington's highly original and insightful book does just that. Whether or not one accepts all aspects of Hetherington's alternative positive proposal, epistemologists will have much to gain from engaging with the details of his substantial contribution to the field." (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 28 February 2012)
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