Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats
Buch in deiner Nähe kaufen
Beschreibung
Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models will be developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into unified techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.
In this book, leading researchers combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used by security personnel to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). This means a comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat (that is, beyond the static nature of the threat). The book provides a set of scientific tools for analyzing and applying game-theoretic reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These scientific tools address problems of global safety and create more cost-effective defensive investments.
Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book’s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.
The first book to apply game-theoretic models and reliability theory to defending infrastructure against intelligent attacks Demonstrates attack-defense models that avoid the mathematical quagmire of full game-theoretic modeling Applicable to all infrastructure arenas – networked infrastructures such as oil pipelines or electric grids; built infrastructures such as buildings and stadiums; information infrastructures such as flight control or civil defense; and production, processing and distribution supply chains
Autor*in
Vicki M. Bier
Themen in »Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats«
complexity game theory linear optimization reliability risk analysis quality control, reliability, safety and risk
Stimmen zu »Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats«
From the reviews:
“This book is a collection of several articles on the analysis of defending infrastructure against terrorism attacks by means of game theory and reliability theory. … well written and it can be useful for researchers in this field. It not only provides the state-of-the-art review of attack–defend models but also describes the algorithms in detail.” (J. Li, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 61 (12), 2010)()